

SECRET

IDEALIST, CORONA,
ANSON, ORCAFT

[Redacted]

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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

14 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Security Protection of Ultrasensitive Advanced Intelligence Collection Systems (Recommendation No. 29 of the January 20, 1962 Report to the President by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)

1. This report is in response to your memorandum of April 9, 1962, subject as above, which requested the current status of action taken to meet the objectives of Recommendation No. 29.

a. [Redacted] System:

Continuing attention is being given to the implementation of the [Redacted] System. Project ORCAFT has been approved by the Deputy Director (Research) CIA, Dr. Scoville, and the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Charyk, for inclusion in this uniform system. The system now includes Projects IDEALIST, CORONA, ANSON, and ORCAFT, and this report pertains to these programs.

The Director of Security, CIA, has initiated action toward the centralization within the Office of Security, CIA, records of persons approved for access to programs requiring special clearance for which this Agency has security responsibility. The establishment of such a Center has been approved, and planning calls for the orderly collection of [Redacted] data into the central indices.

b. Security Reindoctrination:

A communication was directed to key [Redacted] Officers throughout the U. S. Intelligence Community emphasizing the White House concern regarding the security of these ultrasensitive programs (See Tab A). The various departments are cooperating in this regard.

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In the industrial area a similar expression of concern was communicated to key cleared individuals, and a periodic reinduction program initiated (See Tab B). An example of the positive action taken by one of our Security Officers in the field is attached (See Tab C).

c. Visits to Contractors:

The program of periodic visits of Headquarters CIA Security Officers to participating industrial firms continues. An example of the scope of matters covered during such visits is outlined in Tab D.

d. Review of "Need to Know" within Department of Defense:

Continuing close liaison is being maintained between representatives of Dr. Charyk, DIA, and the writer, and action continues directed toward an even more critical review of need to know of candidates for special clearances. Serious consideration is being given to a redefinition of certain sensitive information currently requiring an operational [redacted] clearance with the objective of authorizing access to such information by a person possessing a product ("T" system) clearance; e.g., camera information. It is felt that as a consequence of such redefinition, the number of persons requiring operational clearances, and consequently privy to broader operational data, will be considerably reduced.

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e. Individuals Cleared for Access - Operational Projects:

The number of persons in Government and industry cleared for access to the operational CORONA, ANGON, and IDEALIST programs as of 1 May 1962 is set forth below. It should be recognized that even those persons listed as fully witting are provided only the information required to do their job. Similarly, the individuals in industry approved for limited access are restricted to the information needed to effectively perform. Many in this category, mechanics for example, are not informed of mission, CIA participation, etc., but are "cleared" security wise as a defense against penetration or sabotage.

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ARMED, SECRET

[Redacted]

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Fully Lifting
U.S. Gov't. Industry

Partial Knowledge
Industry

COMINT

ARMED

INTELLIGENCE

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1. Individuals Cleared for Access - Project SECRET:

With regard to Project SECRET, recently approved for incorporation into the [Redacted] and which is not yet in the operational stage, a more comprehensive analysis of the number of persons cleared is attached (see Tab B).

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2. The above provides an insight into the current status of these programs from the security standpoint. It is also worthy of note that the Security staff is continuously confronted with building up possible leaks, damage due to accurate speculation, etc. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

SIGNED

HERBERT SCOWILL, JR.
Deputy Director (Research)

cc: President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
(Attention: [Redacted])

ILLEGIB

Signature Recommended:

[Redacted]

AC/DFD

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